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REPLY TO CRITICS OF THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
Richard A. Posner*
The Review is to be commended for having assembled so formidable an array of distinguished scholars well qualified to criticize my
Holmes Lectures. Nussbaum is a leading normative moral philosopher
(what I call in the Lectures an "academic moralist'), with a side interest in law. Dworkin is also a distinguished academic moralist, but in
addition he is the leading scholar of jurisprudence in the Englishspeaking world and a prominent constitutional theorist. Dean Kronman has a background in moral philosophy that has informed most of
his influential academic writings. And Justice Fried and Judge
Noonan are probably the most distinguished living judges who, before
ascending the bench, made important contributions as academics to
both jurisprudence and moral theory. Those who think, as I do, that
John Stuart Mill was correct when he said in the second essay in On
Liberty that no position can be confidently affirmed until it has been
tested in the fires of hostile criticism' will understand the importance
of my five critics' Responses

-

and of this Reply

-

to a proper

evaluation of my Lectures.
Having now read the Responses, I am more confident of the position taken in the Lectures, although willing to concede the need for
amplification or correction in several particulars. The many disagreements among the five critics, their own criticisms of academic moralism and its applicability to law, the vulnerability (which I shall try to
demonstrate) of their arguments, the defensive cast of some of the Responses and the scornful tone of the others, their sheer length, and
their failure (with the very partial exception of Dworkin's Response)
even to attempt to demonstrate how moral reasoning can actually convince doubters or aid judges reinforce my belief in the essential soundness of the Lectures.
I. RONALD DwoRKiN

I am grateful to Professor Dworkin for supplying - and on the
very first page of his Response, where it cannot be missed - a potent
new argument for my position. Let me restate it. Either my arguments against the usefulness of moral theory are successful, and then I
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School.

I See

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY

ig-55 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press

1989) (1859).
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win this debate hands down, or my arguments are, as he believes, unsuccessful ("spectacularly unsuccessful"2 is his formulation), and then I
have proved (for I am a judge, and he is kind enough to describe me
as "intelligent" and even "eminent,"3 though he may be speaking
tongue in cheek) that judges are indeed incapable of doing moral theory. But he gives me too much credit in supposing that I 4made bad arguments deliberately, setting springes to catch woodcocks.
As this example suggests, Dworkin's gifts include a skill in polemical thrust and parry that I, greatly to my regret, cannot match. But
his polemical gift has its dark side. A reviewer of his most recent book
remarks "Dworkin's relentless 'spin' and partisanship" and his "reluctance ... to make and confront the best arguments against [his] own
Evidence to support these criticisms is everywhere in
views."'
Dworkin's Response, but particularly noteworthy is his accusation that
I have misrepresented his views by endorsing Duncan Kennedy's
summary of Dworkin's legal positions on civil disobedience, the prosecution of draft-card burners, and the role of distributive considerations. For it turns out that Kennedy's reading of Dworkin is
more accurate than Dworkin's own. It is true that Dworkin's main argument about civil disobedience, including that of draft-card burners
and other dissenters from the draft during the Vietnam War, is that the
government ought not to have prosecuted these people, not that if it
had done so they should have been acquitted. He reserves judgment6
on the question whether the Constitution required their acquittal.
But he goes on to say that even if the laws under which the draft resisters were convicted are constitutional, the "Court should [have] acquit[ted]" these defendants, because "before its decision [upholding the
constitutionality of the laws,] the validity of the draft was doubtful,
and it is unfair to punish men for disobeying a doubtful law."7 An acquittal on this ground would, of course, be a judgment of law, albeit
not a ruling on constitutionality. Dworkin claims that he has been
"careful to say that [his] views about civil disobedience, including
2 Ronald Dworkin, Darwin'sNew Bulldog, III HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1718 (1998).
3 See id.
4 See id. Dworkin is alluding to WILLIAAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act i, sc. 3,1. 115, at
205 (Harold Jenkins ed., Methuen 1982). If the analogy is carried through, I am Hamlet and
Dworkin is Ophelia!
S Maimon Schwarzschild, Book Review, Io8 ETHICS 597, 599 (1998) (reviewing RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996)).

6 He does say, however, that "a reasonable and competent lawyer might well think that [the
arguments for the unconstitutionality of the draft] present a stronger case, on balance, than the
counterarguments." RONALD DWORKrN, Civil Disobedience, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
2o6, 209-10 (1978). From this and other passages, it is possible to infer that Dworkin would have
sided with those who thought the convictions of the draft resisters unconstitutional. See id. at
219.

7 Id. at 221.
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draft-card burning, are not judgments of law."s He does not qualify
"judgments of law" with the word "constitutional." Nor does Kennedy
do so in describing Dworkin's position.
Dworkin also accuses Kennedy, and derivatively me, of incorrectly
attributing to him a belief in "explicit consideration of distributive consequences rather than reliance on efficiency."9 To refute this attribution, he cites a passage in his book Freedom's Law denying that "economic equality" should be a constitutional right.' 0 Again, Dworkin
misrepresents Kennedy's claim. The claim was that Dworkin believes
that courts should consider distributive consequences rather than efficiency in deciding cases. Dworkin does not deny that claim. He could
not, since he believes that the common law should be shaped not by
efficiency, but rather by an egalitarian conception that he calls "equality of resources.""
Because, when he is mounted on his polemical steed, Dworkin has
difficulty giving an accurate account of his own writings, one should
not be optimistic about the accuracy of his account of mine. I can
barely recognize the argument of my Lectures in his reformulation of
it. Either I am an unclear writer, or he is indeed an uncharitable
reader. I spent much time at the beginning of the Lectures trying as
best I could to explain, at the risk of losing my readers to tedium, what
I meant by "moral theory," "moral skepticism," "moral relativism," and
so forth; yet Dworkin is unable to extract any meaning from my efforts. (Affected obtuseness about an opponent's argument is a common tactic in philosophical debate; it is also employed in Nussbaum's
Response.) He says that I erroneously classify moral relativism, moral
subjectivism, and moral skepticism as forms of "external [moral) skepticism" in his sense, whereas the focus of his paper on moral skepticism
that I cited is internal skepticism.' 2 Internal skepticism is indeed the
focus of that paper; but all I meant was that "moral relativism,"
"moral subjectivism," and "moral skepticism" as I defined them in my
Lectures fit his category of external skepticism. I should have thought
my meaning clear. Passing on to another of the points Dworkin makes
8

Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1721 n.12.
9 Id. (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Problematicsof Moral and Legal Theory, i i HARv. L.
REV. 1637, 1686 n.98 (i998) (quoting DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 127
('997))).
10 See id. (citing RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 36 (I996)).
11 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 299 (1986). His Response implicitly endorses the use of

distributive considerations to decide products liability cases, by citing favorably an article that
makes clear that references to "fairness" by the judges in these cases have a significant distributive
component. See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1728 & n.35 (citing James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial

Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEo.
NWASH. L. REv. 1570 (1991)).
12 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1721 n.ii (quoting Posner, supra note 9, at 1642 n.6) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
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in his footnote nine, I thought I had made clear what I meant by
"moral realism," "right answers," and "metaphysics" by quoting
Dworkin's colleague Thomas Nagel on "right answers moral realism" 3
and, by way of contrast, Charles Larmore on "metaphysical moral realism."
I should have thought it also clear that I was not contradicting myself in saying that a society's unquestioning acceptance of a taboo
against intermarriage would not make the taboo morally right. That
acceptance would make the taboo part of the moral code of the society,
but people in other societies would be entitled to embrace a different
morality, one that would condemn the taboo. Similarly, the Chinese
might "validly" condemn the Irish law on abortion, and vice versa two moral claims, both valid within the presuppositions of the culture
in which they are made, but incompatible, and with no higher morality in light of which the difference in opinion could be arbitrated.
Dworkin says that I argue that his proposal for judges to use moral
theory to decide cases would fall flat if he substituted "political theory"
for "moral theory";14 he points out that political theory and moral theory are very similar. They are - I made that point in my Lectures but he has misquoted me. I said that his proposal would fall flat if he
argued in political rather than moral "terms," that is, if he acknowledged that he was asking the courts to enact his left-liberal policy
agenda, the agenda summarized by Duncan Kennedy.
Dworkin implies that I believe that pragmatism can resolve the
moral disagreement between the prolife and prochoice camps.' 5 On
the contrary, pragmatism, at least my sort of pragmatism, recognizes
that the moral disagreement is insoluble and wishes to use this recognition as the starting point when deciding what abortion rights, if any,
to recognize.
Dworkin again shows his recklessness as a critic in his discussion of
my comments on "British legal practice," which he claims are "illinformed. 1 6 The term "British legal practice" is a solecism, since
Britain (he means, I take it, the United Kingdom) does not have a unitary legal system. The comment of mine that he claims is "illinformed," and moreover inconsistent with what I wrote in a recent
book on English law (that is, the law of England and Wales, but not of
Scotland or Northern Ireland), is that English judges so rarely have to
make policy choices that when they do so they have the feeling that
"they're step[ping] outside the law," a term that I quoted from H.L.A.
'3 This is Dworkin's position. In his Response, he puts it this way: "Any moral principle, no
matter how thoroughly embedded in our culture, language, and practice, may yet be false - or,
no matter how thoroughly rejected, may yet be true." Id. at 1719. He states this dogmatically; he
does not acknowledge that it is a contestable position.
14 Id. at 173o n.46.
Is See id. at 1735.

16 Id. at 1727 n.32.
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Hart's writings. Dworkin says that my book "rejects the descriptive
accuracy of Hart's statement, as much for British as for American
practice."1 7 Anyone who cares to look at my book will see that this is
incorrect: although I say that it is not semantically accurate for Hart to
call what judges do in the "open area" in which the conventional materials of judicial decisionmaking run out "stepping outside the law," I
also say that his account of judicial activity in the open area is "descriptively" more accurate than Dworkin's, certainly for English
judges. 18 Throughout the book I emphasize that English judges, like
Continental judges but unlike American judges, constitute in fact,
though not in form, a career judiciary, which "tends to be homogeneous in values and preferences, narrowly professional, technically adept
...and politically timid - adding up to a mindset highly congenial to
legal positivism." 19 Hart was an English legal positivist, and his positivism captured important features of English law, just as Dworkin's
very different jurisprudential stance captures important features of
American law.
As evidence of my "culpable misdescription" of what he insists on
calling "British practice," 20 Dworkin cites an English case in which the
question was whether removal of life support from a patient in a vegetative state was lawful; the answer given was "yes," and was based,
Dworkin claims, on moral reasoning. 2 1 But Dworkin cites only the
decision of the intermediate appellate court, not the decision of the
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which corresponds to our
Supreme Court.22 It's like discussing Roe v. Wade and citing only the
Fifth Circuit decision that the Supreme Court reviewed. The judges of
the House of Lords, like the judges of our own Supreme Court in last
Term's euthanasia cases, reached their decision on legal rather than
moral grounds. Their queasiness about the moral issue was well expressed by one of the Lords, Browne-Wilkinson. He pointed out that
while the judges of the intermediate court had attached importance to
"impalpable factors such as personal dignity and the way Anthony
17

Id.

18 RicHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 18 (1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
19 Id. at 3 1-32 (footnote omitted).
20 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1727 n.32. The reference to "British practice" is of course a small
mistake; Dworkin's reference elsewhere in his Response to the Equal Protection Clause as protecting only citizens, see id. at 1732, is only a little larger; but these mistakes, like his uncritical
belief that references to "fairness" in tort cases invoke moral categories, are suggestive of a lack of
interest in the actual texture of law, a lack highly consistent with his overall approach.
21 See id. at I728 n.32 (citing Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [i993] 2 W.L.R. 316 (C.A.)).
Dworkin calls it a "parallel case" to the Supreme Court's recent euthanasia cases, id., echoing the
argument of the philosophers' brief that there is no morally significant difference between killing
and failing to save. This is the same mistake that Judith Jarvis Thomson makes in equating abortion by a rape victim to a refusal to save a famous violinist.
22 See Airedale NHS 'f"ust v. Bland, [I993] I All E.R. 858 (H.L.).
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Bland would wish to be remembered," those judges had not taken into
account "spiritual values which, for example, a member of the Roman
Catholic church would regard as relevant in assessing such benefit."23
With the moral issue thus a standoff, Browne-Wilkinson opined that
"the moral, social and legal issues raised by this case should be considered by Parliament, 24 and added that he had reached his own conclusion about how to decide the case on "narrow, legalistic grounds." 25
I could go on beating back Dworkin's charges of obscurity, ignorance, and contradiction one by one, but I think I've said enough to
induce a warranted distrust in his accuracy, so let me turn instead to
the significant propositions in his Response. The first is that everyone
who isn't a clod does moral reasoning and does it by starting with an
intuition and then defending it against arguments, and that all the
academic moralist does is carry this process of justificatory expansion
or ascent (what the legal process school of the 1950s called "reasoned
elaboration' to higher levels of abstraction. This is not in fact how
the "common man," which is to say virtually everyone not professionally engaged in moral philosophy, arrives at his moral opinions. As I
said in my Lectures, moral arguments, even when made by someone
with the analytical and polemical skills of a Ronald Dworkin, are too
feeble to move people. I offered some evidence in support of that
proposition; he offers no contrary evidence (none of the critics does),
but instead tries some intellectual jujitsu. He claims that my thesis
that moral theory does not provide a "solid basis" for moral judgments
is itself a moral thesis. 26 But his entire argument for this claim con-

sists of translating "solid basis" into "sound basis" and then equating
"sound" with "morally sound."27 This definitional chain, forged without an explanation, is arbitrary. I argue that moral reasoning in the
style of Dworkin and other academic moralists is too weak to shake
anyone's moral intuitions: not too weak morally, but epistemologically
that is, as a matter of logic and evidence. This is not to say that
utilitarianism or Kantianism, or any other normative moral position,
wholesale or retail, is unsound, but only that the arguments pro or con
are too flaccid to induce a sensible person to change his beliefs or behavior.
Dworkin asks us to imagine that there are many people who,
though not philosophers or even intellectuals, have "a yearning for
ethical and moral integrity" or "want a vision of how to live.128

Such

people, he claims, "might well ask themselves, for example, whether
23 Id. at 879.
24

Id.

2S Id.

at 884.

Dworkin, supra note
marks omitted).
26

27
28

2,

at 1725 (quoting Posner, supra note 9, at 1639) (internal quotation

See id.
Id. at 1726.
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their views about abortion presuppose some more general position
about the connection between sentience and interests or rights." 29 The
picture is of people standing around waiting to connect with Dworkin,
who speaks in just those lofty terms.3 0 I don't think there are many
people like that; very few people outside the academy talk in the highfalutin' style of academic moralism or can understand arguments
couched in that style; how many even know what "sentience" means?
Dworkin takes me to be denying the value of a parent's appeal to a
child's sense of fairness.3 1 That is absurd. My criticisms are of academic moralism, the high-flown stuff of Dworkin's own writings. It is
especially odd for him to locate his work on the same spectrum with
parental instruction because he defines "morally responsible people" as
people who "worry about whether their [moral] convictions are
sound."3 2 This definition excludes children and limits morally responsible people to people who are a potential audience for Dworkin. I define a morally responsible person as a person who behaves morally. I
shall remind the reader when I get to Nussbaum's Response that being
moral and being reflective are not the same thing, and may even be in
tension.
Even if many people could understand and be moved by Dworkin's arguments about abortion and other issues of law or public policy,
as soon as these people were exposed to counterarguments they would
be moved right back to wherever they had been before reading
Dworkin. Every move in normative moral argument can be checked
by a countermove. The discourse of moral theory is interminable because indeterminate. Dworkin no doubt believes that he has won his
duels with his academic opponents over abortion and euthanasia and
the like, but one like myself who does not have strong views on these
questions rates these duels as ties.
Dworkin tries to refute pragmatic moral skepticism by broadening
the definition of moral theory to encompass all normative argument
(this is a recurrent feature of the Responses), so that a judge would
have to be speechless to avoid doing moral theory. But the simplest
type of normative argument - argument in reference to stipulated
goals,- eludes even Dworkin's definitional sweep. That kind of argument cannot be understood as moral. Were there a consensus that
the goal of accident law should be to minimize the sum of accident and
accident-avoidance costs, letting the insurance markets buffer the
wealth effects of accidents, then it would be possible to evaluate the
29

Id. at 1722.

Here is a sample of Dworkin's rhetoric, picked virtually at random: "The courts are the
capitals of law's empire, and judges are its princes, but not its seers and prophets. It falls to philosophers, if they are willing, to work out law's ambitions for itself, the purer form of law within
and beyond the law we have." DWORKIN, supra note ii, at 407.
31 See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1724.
30

32

Id. at 1722.
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doctrines of that law without entering contested moral territory. Policy
arguments would be omnipresent, but they would owe nothing to
moral theory. Consensus on ends or goals is found in some areas of
law, but not in all. When it comes to issues like abortion and euthanasia, there is no consensus on ends, and so the issues have to be
resolved by force, elections, compromise, legislation, judges' values,
public opinion, default, exhaustion, distraction by other issues, changes
in religious belief (not themselves induced by moral theory) or in demographics or in technology, considerations of feasibility, or emotional
appeals (for example, the film The Silent Scream). Moral theory won't
33
play a role.

Dworkin confuses the issue by dividing the normative realm into
moral theory on the one hand and "instrumental or strategic considerations" on the other.3 4 But "instrumental" and "strategic" are not the
same, and joining them muddies the waters. "Strategic" has overtones
of game theory, warfare, and Machiavellian scheming. The relevant
distinction is between reasoning over ends and reasoning over means.
I argue in my Lectures that the latter is productive and the former unproductive. Dworkin presents no counterargument.
Might there be a way of reasoning over moral ends without using
moral theory? I don't think so. Whether or not the academic moralist
or his legal counterpart decides to trundle out the great names of
moral philosophy is a question of taste rather than of substance. I
claim that there is no profitable reasoning over ends, though of course
there is frequent choice among ends - choice that is determined, however, by things other than the "weight" of opposing arguments. I am
speaking of ultimate ends - for there are of course mediate ones but it is the ultimate ends that are in contention in the moral debates
over abortion, euthanasia, and the other topics that Dworkin likes to
discuss.
He argues that a moral relativist, conceding that there are moral
truths -- even if only local rather than universal - must likewise concede a role, albeit only a local one, to moral theories based on those
truths. 35 But this point, too, founders on Dworkin's failure to distinguish reasoning over ends from reasoning over means. If there is consensus within a community on some moral principle, then arguments
33 For a striking example of the indeterminacy of moral argument, and hence the wisdom of
judges in steering clear of it, see the criticism of the philosophers' brief by a moral theorist colleague of Dworkin's who shares his general philosophical and ideological bent. See F.M. Kamm,
A Right to Choose Death?:A Moral Argumentfor the Permissibilityof Euthanasiaand PhysicianAssisted Suicide, BOSTON REV., Summer 2997, at 20, 23. The subtitle is misleading. Kamm endorses physician-assisted suicide only when unbearable pain cannot be otherwise relieved and the
patient prefers death to continued pain, although she leaves open the possibility that it might be
permissible in other situations as well. See id.
34 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 173o n.46.
3S See id. at 1725-26.

HeinOnline -- 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1803 1997-1998

18o4

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. III:X796

over the validity of the principle drop out, and the issue becomes the
principle's proper application. A good example is the principle that
infanticide is wrong. It is not a universal principle, but it is solidly entrenched in our society. Dworkin is not interested in the areas of
moral consensus within our society. He wants to talk about precisely
those issues that cannot be stabilized by reference to a local consensus.
Nor can they be stabilized by stretching consensus notions to cover
them (as by appealing to our consensus on the immorality of infanticide to resolve the issue of abortion) - this stretching being what
Dworkin fancily describes as "showing the implications of principles
and ideals latent in the public culture of modern democracies." 36 The
moral theorist either picks controversial principles that determine his
preferred outcome, or picks consensus principles and draws an arbitrary line connecting them to that outcome.
Dworkin contends that moral issues are inescapable in adjudication. In evaluating this contention, we shall do well to distinguish
among three possible relations between a moral issue and a case.
First,. the legal issue may have moral significance to some part of the
community; the legal issue of abortion rights has moral significance to
prolife and prochoice people. Second, judges might decide some cases
on moral grounds. And third, they might decide some cases using the
argumentative methods of academic moralism. I have no quarrel with
the first relation between law and morality - or with the second.
Some legal principles, notably those of the criminal law, are plainly informed by the moral opinions of the community. But the application
of a moral principle to a legal issue must not be confused with taking
sides on contested moral issues and using normative moral philosophy
to resolve the contest. That is the relation between morality and law
that I question. You don't find moral theory deployed in appeals from
convictions for rape or murder, even though the criminalizing of rape
and murder is based upon a moral principle; and this absence is no
loss.
There are pseudomoral issues in law. Dworkin argues that when
judges use moral terms such as "fairness," as they often do, they must
be doing moral theory.37 But as Holmes pointed out in The Path of the
Law - it is one of his major themes - the same word may be used in
38
a moral and in a legal sense, and the two senses need not coincide.
Dworkin has to unpack the word "fairness," and he has not done so.
The threefold distinction that I have sketched can help us see the
fallacy in Dworkin's argument that when a court decides a case in
which there is a moral issue, it cannot avoid making a moral judgment. Suppose Congress amended the Constitution to abolish the con36 Id. at 1726.
37 See id. at 1728-29.
38 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, ioHARV. L. REv. 457, 459-64 (1897).
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stitutional right to abortion, and afterward a case came up to the Supreme Court challenging a law forbidding abortion. The Court would
throw out the case, giving victory to the opponents of abortion, but it
would not be resolving a moral issue. That is obvious. And it is almost as obvious that if the Court decided that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not create substantive rights, and
on that ground overruled Roe v. Wade, it would be deciding the legal
question of abortion rights but saying nothing about the moral right.
Yet I am not sure that Dworkin would agree. He says that once Roe v.
Wade was decided, abortions early in pregnancy imposed no moral
cost comparable to the cost to pregnant women refused abortions, because the Court's decision diminished the moral entitlement of the fetus by depriving it of its rights. 39 It seems to me that Roe v. Wade left
the moral issue exactly where it found it. To think otherwise is to
suppose that the Dred Scott decision increased the moral worth of
slavery, Plessy v. Ferguson the moral worth of racial segregation, and
Bowers v. Hardwick the moral worth of antisodomy laws. (You can
see in these examples where Dworkin's approach of thinking of law as
a branch of moral philosophy can lead.) All three decisions may have
affected public opinion or even the public's moral views; but none of
the decisions was a contribution to moral truth or value. Like everyone else, judges have moral views, and those views may - sometimes
quite properly - influence judicial decisions. I just don't think that
their (that anyone's) moral views are likely to be improved by immersion in moral theory, or that judicial decisions furnish right answers to
moral questions, such as the moral rights of a fetus.
Dworkin is the only one of my critics to take up a specific issue and
try to show how moral theory can resolve it. He sketches a moral argument for the decision in Brown v. Board of Education: that the
Equal Protection Clause does not allow government to justify a law on
the basis that some citizens (actually the Equal Protection Clause is
not limited to citizens) are inferior to others or less deserving of consideration, and that it is demonstrable that official segregation could
not be justified on any alternative assumption.4 0 I have no objection
to reading an anticaste principle into the Equal Protection Clause,
given the history of the Clause and the recession of nineteenth-century
racist theories. But you don't need moral theory to do this. I don't
see how it could do this, because if nineteenth-century racial science
were true, which is an issue of science rather than of moral theory, it
would mean that blacks were inferior, and then there would be an argument for providing them a different public education.

.9 See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1729-30 & n.43.
40 See id. at 1731-32.
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The problem for the Court in Brown was to exclude interpretations
of segregation that were rivals of the caste interpretation. That was
neither a scientific nor a moral problem, but a political problem; the
Court wanted to avoid accusing the Southern states of operating a
caste system. There was no work for moral theory to do in the case,
except mischief. 4 1 The problem for equal protection today is that the
anticaste principle does not work in the areas (such as abortion and
homosexual rights) in which people want to use the Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate laws; but moral theory doesn't help there either.
It's otiose in either type of case.
If Dworkin wishes to continue our debate, here is a method by
which he can test his claim that moral reasoning is omnipresent in judicial opinions. I have written more than i5oo judicial opinions, covering pretty much the whole range of fields and issues that Dworkin
has discussed over his long career (including civil disobedience and,
yes, a murdering heir case), except for euthanasia and homosexual
rights (but I've had cases involving transsexuals). Let him find, if he
can, in a sample, random or otherwise, of my opinions the proof that
no judge (at least no "eminent" judge) can escape having to do moral
philosophy.
IT. CHARLES FRIED
Justice Fried makes a good point against me - that in defining
morality as the set of duties to others that are designed to check our
merely self-interested, emotional, or sentimental reactions to serious
questions of conduct, I was implying that moral judgments cannot be
reduced to raw emotion and therefore acknowledging a role for moral
reasoning in those judgments.42 That may indeed be an implication of
what I said. But it is not what I meant, as should have been clear
from the Lectures as a whole. The social function of moral duties,
such as the duty (in our society) not to respond to the discovery of the
adultery of one's spouse by killing the adulterer, is indeed to impose a
check, in the interest of social order, on the instinctive or impulsive reaction to an affront, a threat, or an opportunity. In other words, a
moral duty is like a leash - and a dog is constrained by a leash without having to reason. When I swerve to avoid hitting a pedestrian or
help an elderly person across the street, I am not enacting the conclu41 An argument against Brown can easily be generated from John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, a
favorite of Dworkin's. See RONALD DWORKIN, Liberty and Liberalism, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 259 (1978). Mill famously argued that, however odious polygamy is (and he considered

it odious), the Mormons should have been left to their own devices in Utah, provided only that
persons who did not like polygamy were free to leave. See MILL, supra note x, at 91-92. By
1954, blacks who did not want to live under the Jim Crow laws had long been able to move to
Northern states that did not have such laws. Many had done so.
42 See Charles Fried, PhilosophyMatters, iii HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (x998).
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sion of a process of moral reflection. A check on an emotional reaction
can be another emotion (for example, fear might check hunger); it
needn't be an argument.
I take Fried to be meeting me halfway when he describes the arguments that academic moralists make as "argument fragments." 43
What I would like to see now is a demonstration of how those fragments can be assembled into a convincing argument. Fried says they
can be, and remarks intimidatingly that Rawls and O'Neill are the
peers of G6del and Fermat,4 but he gives no examples of convincing
moral argument except to cite his own book on contracts, 45 and so I
will content myself with a countercitation. 46 I am tantalized by his
reticence, because he is derisive on the one hand about the "whole
catechism of canonical left-liberal opinions"4 7 (read: Dworkin's opinions) and on the other hand about the natural-law theory expounded
by John Finnis.4" One would like to hear how moral philosophy can
navigate between these shoals.
Fried wants particularly to show that academic moralism influences judges. This surprises me. He has written that lawyers (and
implicitly judges) should think of themselves not as social architects or
social engineers, but as social "janitors,"4 9 and that law is emphatically
not philosophy: "So what is it that lawyers and judges know that philosophers and economists do not? The answer is simple: the law."5 0 I
had not thought he meant that the difference between philosophers
and lawyers is that philosophers know only philosophy, and lawyers
know philosophy plus law; that would be an awful lot to ask of lawyers, and would make philosophers seem a lazy bunch, unless they too
have a second field. But now he cites three judicial opinions to show
that judges do moral philosophy after all - one by Judge (now Justice) Breyer, one by Justice Thomas, and one by Justice Fried.-' It is
instructive to examine these opinions. (Oddly, none is a majority
opinion.)
43 Id. at 1750.
44 See id. at 1747.
45 See id. at 174o n.12, 1745 n.45 (citing CHARLEs FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (I98I)).

46 See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MIcH. L. REv. 489, 490, 517-2,3 (1989).
47 Fried, supra note 42, at 1740.
48 See id. at 1746-47.
49 See Charles Fried, JurisprudentialResponses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 331,
333 (1988).
5o Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 6o TEX.L. REV.

35, 57 (ig8i).
51 See Fried, supra note 42, at 1743 n.32 (citing Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. I36, 146
(i997) (Fried, J., concurring)); id. at 1744 n.35 (citing NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 674 F.2d 130, I32 (ist Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J., concurring), rev'd, 462 U.S. 393 (1983)); id. at
1744 n.38 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, I16 S. Ct 1495, I15 (x996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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The issue in Breyer's case was whether remarks by a supervisor
revealed anti-union animus, and Breyer's opinion discusses the problems involved in drawing inferences.5 2 It is possible, though not obvious from his opinion, that Breyer was drawing on epistemology, but as
there was nothing remotely resembling a moral issue in the case, I
cannot see how the opinion can be thought to illustrate the use of
moral theory by judges. The issue in Thomas's case was the constitutionality of a state statute banning the advertising of liquor prices.5 3
His opinion argues that government shouldn't be allowed to keep people ignorant (for example, of the price of lawful products). 5 4 There is
no reference to anything recognizable as moral theory, unless the argument that I have just mentioned, on which Thomas (who is said by
Fried to have "dabbled" in political philosophy 55 ) does not elaborate,
can be thought a product of it. Fried's own opinion involves a registration requirement for convicted sex offenders.5 6 One will search the
opinion in vain for moral theory. The heart of the opinion is the
proposition that for the state to justify "a continuing, intrusive, and
humiliating regulation" of a convicted person by the urgency of the
need to prevent his inflicting further harm on the community, "the urgency must be shown by the severity of the harm and the likelihood of
its occurrence. 5 7 This sounds like Learned Hand's cost-benefit formula for determining negligence,5 8 rather than like philosophy.5 9 Fried
makes no effort to derive the Fried formula from moral theory, unless
it is through moral theory that we learn that "we do not have a general
regime regulating adult competent persons as such," that "[p]ersons are
left to choose freely and if they make the wrong choices they are subject to retrospective condemnation and punishment.160 One begins to
suspect - and there are further hints elsewhere in Fried's Response
and in a discussion of homosexual rights to which he refers the
52

See TransportationManagement, 674 F.2d at 132-33.

53
55
56

See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at i5oi.
See id. at 15 x6 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See Fried, supra note 42, at 1744 & n.36.
See Doe, 686 N.E.2d at ioi6 (Fried, J., concurring).

57

Id.

54

58 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 E2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMuc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.z (5th ed. 998). Earlier in his opinion, Fried said in like
vein that the registration requirement "may be imposed after a careful weighing of three factors:
the kind and severity of the regulatory imposition, the kind and severity of the danger sought to
be averted, and the aptness of the fit between the remedial measure and the danger to be
averted." Doe, 686 N.E.2d at ioi6 (Fried, J., concurring).
59 Fried also conjectures that one of Justice Brennan's opinions (once again, not a majority
opinion) was directly influenced by an essay of Ronald Dworkin's on affirmative action. See
Fried, supra note 42, at 1745 n.42 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). On the basis of
what I know about Brennan's intellectual horizons and mode of work, I consider this unlikely.
60 Doe, 686 N.E.2d at ior5 (citation omitted).
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reader 6 ' - that, like Dworkin, Fried equates moral principle to principle and morality to normativity.
Fried tries to demonstrate the influence of the ideas of moral philosophy on history. In this endeavor he draws a sharper distinction
than I would be inclined to draw between Lenin and Marx. The former is, in Fried's words, a "master rhetorician[]." The latter he groups
with writers who are "systematic, elaborately reasoned, attentive to
and careful about method, explicit about premises, and explicit as well
about how conclusions flow from them." Marx, Fried says, is a
thinker "who [sought] to persuade by argument and reason, not... by
exhortation and rhetoric. '62 I do not recognize Marx in this description. He was highly rhetorical, was neither careful about method nor
explicit about his premises, was a prophet rather than a thinker and a
journalist rather than an academic. I am surprised that Fried would
wish to enroll him with Rawls, O'Neill, and Fried himself in the ranks
of academic moralism. But there is a more important reason for leaving him out than his lack of the professorial virtues and vocation.
Marx was one of those moralists whose moral claims are entangled
with factual claims, such as the misery of life under capitalism, the
growing disparity between the wealth of the capitalists and the poverty of the workers, the inevitability of a workers' revolution, and the
withering away of the state and attainment of earthly paradise upon
the completion of that revolution. Every one of these factual claims
has been falsified by history. A moral philosopher whose moral claims
are as dependent on factual claims as Marx's can fairly be considered
refuted when his factual claims are falsified. So Marx has been refuted - but I certainly will not deny that he has been influential.
As for Locke, Kant, and Hegel, the unrefuted moral philosophers
who Fried claims have influenced the world outside the academy, they
did their work in milieus that cannot be compared to today's world of
academic moral philosophy, because knowledge was so much less specialized and the academy so much less professionalized. And I have
doubts that even those three great philosophers influenced the real
world, doubts not stilled by the references in Fried's footnote twentyeight. But as the question of intellectual influence is a profoundly difficult one, I will content myself with merely recording my doubt that
there would have been no American Revolution, or that it would have
eventuated in a different constitutional structure, had Locke never
lived.
But I should say a word more about specialization. As late as the
nineteenth century, the boundaries between philosophy and the sci61 See Fried, supra note 42, at 1745 n.43 (citing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 82-83
Those pages are faintly Millian; his discussion of homosexual rights as a whole, see
FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 83-85, has no philosophical compass that I can discern.
(igi)).

62 Fried, supra note 42, at 1742.
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ences - both the natural and the social sciences - were indistinct and
often crossed. Bentham was a lawyer, economist, and practical reformer, as well as a philosopher, and his suggestions for the reform of
criminal justice can be accepted by people who reject utilitarianism;
the suggestions do not collapse when their philosophical scaffolding is
removed. Locke's influential political theory can be detached from its
metaphysical foundations in Christian theology and its moral foundations in the idea that productive labor creates entitlements. Such political innovations as republicanism, the separation of powers, the system of checks and balances, and the secularization of politics can likewise be detached from their philosophical aegis and evaluated without
regard to philosophical principles. So Locke can be discussed by both
political scientists and moral philosophers, but the discussions by the
political scientists are likely to be more fruitful.
Herbert Spencer, another of Fried's examples of influential moral
thinkers, 63 was a leading proponent of social Darwinism, a body of
thought that I concede was influential in nineteenth-century America
and elsewhere. And it can be described as a moral philosophy. But it
was influential because it was marketed and bought as science - as,
indeed, was Marxism ("scientific socialism'). Also like Marx, Spencer
is thoroughly discredited. It is ironic that Fried's best exemplars of the
influence of moral philosophy on behavior are also the most discredited. 64
ll.

ANTHONY KRONMAN

I find much with which to agree in Dean Kronman's Response, in
particular his criticism of the professionalization of moral philosophy.
And I am pleased that, like me, he thinks the Supreme Court is right
not to treat law as a "subfield of morality" 65 (contrary to Dworkin,
whose claims about the relation between morality and law Kronman
calls "extravagant"66) and not to decide the abortion or euthanasia
cases on the basis of briefs submitted by philosophers. A large area of
disagreement remains, however. The key to it, oddly enough, lies in
Kronman's claim that my Lectures are permeated by "pessimism" and

63 See id. at 1743.
64 One small point, finally, of clarification. Fried seems to infer from my classifying Catharine
MacKinnon as a moral entrepreneur (and from the alleged similarity of our platform styles to
each other's and Fidel Castro's!) that MacKinnon and I are intellectual soulmates. See id. at 1739
& n.3. That is not correct; we have profound differences over a broad range of issues. See
RIcHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 352-53 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1998); RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 357-67 (I995); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 32-33,
371-72 (1992). I meant "moral entrepreneur" as a descriptive rather than as an evaluative term.
65 Anthony T. Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, xix HARv. L. REV. 1751, 1761 (1998).
66 See id. at 1764.
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are "despairing from start to finish." 67 I would not be surprised to be
described as a complacent optimist, a Pollyanna who revels in the fall
of communism, the discomfiture of collectivists, the worldwide triumph (however brief it may prove to be) of free markets and commercial values, and the wealth, freedom, diversity, opportunity, and dazzling technological advances powered by that triumph. The pessimist
is Kronman, because he believes that moral philosophy, which he
agrees is in a sorry state, is essential to civilization. I do not believe
that.
Kronman's pessimism may result in part from his using words like
"moral" and particularly "reason" too broadly; this imprecision may
have confused him about what is really at stake (very little) in the decline of normative moral philosophy. He says that "[tihe kind of moral
quandary in which ordinary men and women find themselves from
time to time, and which demands the exercise of reason, is for judges a
routine predicament."6 8 What is true is that judges routinely confront
issues that cannot be resolved by the application of an algorithm that require instead the application of "practical reason," which (in the
sense in which I am using the term) is the ensemble of methods, including gut reaction, that people use to make decisions when scientific
or mathematical or logical exactness is unattainable. This means that
judicial opinions will often fail to achieve the certitude of a logical,
mathematical, or scientific demonstration. But it does not mean that
judicial opinions are unreasoned, and it certainly does not mean that
the judge is in a "predicament" or a "moral quandary" and has to employ something called "moral reason"69 to get out. The world of inquiry isn't divided into just two compartments, the exact (including
the logical, the mathematical, and the scientific) and the moral. Editing a newspaper requires the constant use of practical reason, but only
very occasionally the making of moral judgments. The same is true of
adjudication. Judges get into moral quandaries only when the law
points to a result that violates their deeply held moral beliefs. That is
not a routine predicament in this country, and moral philosophy will
not help judges out of it. As I argued in my Lectures, moral philosophy is good only at posing, and not at resolving, moral dilemmas.
Judges do legal reasoning, which is not much different from ordinary
reasoning about nonmoral issues; rarely do they engage in moral reasoning, and when they do, it is without the help of academic moral
philosophy.
67 Id. at 1753; see also id. at 1754 (mentioning the "pessimism that gives his Lectures their
bleak and depressing tone").
68 Id. at 1762. This is the equivalent of saying that the ordinary man or woman is sick occasionally, but the doctor is sick all the time. Incidentally, judges are "ordinary men and women."
69 Id.
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I bridle at the suggestion that it is a judicial responsibility to help
"a people achieve[] ... self-conscious maturity. '70 Such a view of the
judicial role implies a condescending view of the American people,
echoing the patronizing and self-important plurality opinion in
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey7' (reaffirming the core of Roe v. Wade),
in which three Supreme Court Justices declared that Americans' "very
'belief in themselves' as "people who aspire to live according to the
rule of law" is "not readily separable from their understanding of the
[Supreme] Court." 72 The American people are as mature as any other
people and, in any event, don't need and won't benefit from judicial
efforts to help them to mature further. Although judicial decisions
(along with everything else - except possibly moral theory) may have
some effect on moral opinion and behavior, it does not follow that
judges should think of themselves as the moral tutors of the nation, as
Kronman (an Aristotelian, hence one to whom moral preachment de
haut en bas comes naturally) would like them to do. Kronman might
do well to ponder Jiirgen Habermas's rebuke to American constitutional theorists for casting the Supreme Court in the role of "a pedagogical guardian or regent" of an incompetent "sovereign," the people. 73 "The addressees of law would not be able to understand
themselves as its authors if the legislator [or judge] were to discover
human rights as pregiven moral facts that merely need to be enacted
as positive law."74 (These passages, incidentally, are a precise description of Dworkin's constitutional theory.)
Kronman's use of the expression "self-conscious maturity" and his
remarks that "[r]eason is the perfection of collective as well as individual character" and that "[o]nly through moral reflection can a people understand its values and hence itself"75 seem to be linked to his
suggestion that psychoanalysis is a route to a better moral character. I
had thought the purpose of psychoanalysis was to make people
happy.76

If Kronman has evidence that psychoanalysis improves

moral character, I would dearly love to see it, especially as he offers no
other evidence that moral philosophy can make us better people. (And
is psychoanalysis really a branch of moral philosophy, even if it does
sometimes conduce to the improvement of character? And should
judges think of themselves as the psychoanalysts of the nation?) I do
not deny the influence of either the Stoic philosophers or Socrates. But
70 Id. at 1763.
71 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
72

Id. at 868.

73 JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMs: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE

THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 278 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
74 Id. at 454.
75 Kronman, supra note 65, at 1763.
76 Kronman may be joining character and happiness when he says that "an examined life of

virtue is superior" to "[a]n unexamined life of habitual virtue." Id. at 1759.
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these are not academic moralists in the modern sense - Socrates least
of all. And Kronman cites the Stoic philosophers only for their feat of
having "reasoned their way into an extraordinary posture of detachment from ordinary human concerns." 77 Indeed so, and with curious results, as when Anaxagoras, upon learning of his child's death,
said, "I was already aware that I had begotten a mortal."78 There is
much valuable psychology in the ethics of Stoicism. But the detachment that Kronman describes as "extraordinary" must really be called
inhuman, and it suggests that there is danger in too much moral reflection. As I said in my Lectures, moral reflection can make the moral
compass wobble.
Kronman mentions no moral philosopher more recent than Aristotle. And he could not have named a Stoic philosopher much more
recent than the third or fourth century A.D., when philosophical Stoicism petered out, though traces and more than traces can be found in
medieval and Renaissance thought, and in Kant and Nietzsche and
elsewhere. That Kronman must cast his net so wide to retrieve a
handful of dubious examples of moral reasoning's effect on behavior is
consistent with his view "that the true spirit of moral reasoning'which starts from the Socratic premise that it can change the way one
lives - is missing from professional philosophy today. ' 79 Indeed it is.
IV. JoHN NOONAN
I agree with Judge Noonan's central theses: that one needs a lawgiver if there are to be moral universals, apart from the tautological
and the vacuous; that no human lawgiver could lay down universal
moral duties; and that, in short, the only tenable ground for believing
in a universal moral law is religious.8 0 And naturally I agree with his
criticisms of academic moralism. There is also merit in his point that
because "every society fails in the long run," it is impossible to use success as a criterion for evaluating a society."' But he has raised the
standard of proof too high. I cannot imagine anyone thinking the
Third Reich a success merely because it hung on for twelve years, the
last three of them in dreadful shape; it completed none of its major
projects except the construction of the autobahns. Thanks to Hitler,
77 Id. at 1754.
78 MARTHA

C. NUSSBAUm,

THE THERAPY OF DESIRE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN HELLEN-

ISTIC ETHICS 363 (1994) (quoting CICERO, TuSCULAN DISPUTATIONS I1.30). Anaxagoras was

himself a pre-Socratic rather than a Stoic, but the statement attributed to him was quoted by the
Stoics as an example of the proper reaction to news of the death of one's child. See id.
79 Kronman, supra note 6s, at 1755.
80 See John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, iiI HARV. L. REv. 1768, 1774 (I998). I

must correct him on a minor point. I am not a tenured member of the University of Chicago faculty, or even a voting member. I am strictly an adjunct.
81 Id. at 1771. This is a standard problem with using the "test of time" as an evaluative
mechanism. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 64, at i9.
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the only major European nation of the nineteenth century that has not
just shrunk but completely disappeared is Prussia. But all this is a detail. I said in my Lectures that you can judge the success of a nation
relative to its goals, not that you can judge the nation itself on a
transcultural standard of morality. And just as I don't think my own
"agnosticism" about moral reasoning is "feigned," so I don't think the
Supreme Court's agnosticism about the moral issues involved in the
abortion and euthanasia cases is feigned. 2 That a case involves a
moral issue does not mean that the court must resolve that issue in order to decide the case.
Noonan's examples of moral progress are troubling. Concerning
slavery, he points out that "after force had decided what the law
should be, a moral consensus emerged."13 But what if the South had
won the Civil War, which it might well have done? Maybe a moral
consensus would not have emerged until much later, when slavery
would have become uneconomical. Would that make moral progress a
function of warfare? Or does Noonan believe that the North won the
war because slavery is immoral, as Lincoln hinted in his second inaugural address? Most scholars think the North won because it was
wealthier, more populous, more industrialized, and more centralized,
and had an abler president.
Noonan's second example of moral progress is the disapproval of
bribery.8 4 That disapproval is an excellent example of the truth of
moral relativism, and not, as he thinks, of its falsity. A bribe is not a
natural kind; it is merely a name for forms of compensation that are
disapproved. The criteria for disapproval vary from society to society
and even within societies, according to distinctions that are often fine.
In our society a judge who accepts equal bribes from the disputants, so
that his judgment is not affected, is still guilty of a crime; but the identical mode of payment is used for the compensation of arbitrators and
is perfectly legal. Threatening to expose someone's secret if he won't
pay you for your silence is blackmail, a crime closely related to bribery.
(Technically, blackmail is a form of extortion, which is the eliciting of
bribes by threats.) But threatening to sue a person if he doesn't settle
with you is perfectly legal. These examples show that characterizing a
transaction as bribery depends on circumstances that are bound to
vary widely across societies and epochs. One would have to know
more than I do, or, I suspect, Judge Noonan does, about the Middle
82 See Noonan, supra note 8o, at 1772 n.24. Noonan's own opinion in one of the euthanasia
cases that the Supreme Court decided last Term - vindicating Noonan's position - avoids any
reference to the moral issues that swirl around euthanasia. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 .3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub noma.Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (i997).
83 Noonan, supra note 8o, at 1773.
84 See id.
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Kingdom of Egypt to fault it for permitting what we consider brib85
ery.
I no longer doubt - and here I am qualifying a point in my Lectures - that one can speak intelligibly of moral progress. But always
one is speaking from a particular standpoint, rather than sub specie aetemitatis. To us, slavery is an abomination, so we consider its abolition a mark of moral progress. There was a time when enough people disagreed to make the issue of the morality of slavery contestable,
and such contests cannot be resolved by the use of reason; the issue of
slavery, as Noonan remarks, was resolved by war.
Noonan ends his Response with some striking observations about
empathy, divinity, and love. To respond to the first: I agree with him
that "to see babies is to see human beings,18 6 but I don't think that this
recognition takes us any distance toward resolving the moral dilemma
of abortion on the basis of moral theory. (He may agree with me on
this point.) As I mentioned in my Lectures, Robin West asks us to see
the woman who dies in a botched illegal abortion as a victim of the
laws forbidding abortion. There is no process of reasoning that will
tell us which sight should move us more. Noonan's religious beliefs,
which inform his views on abortion and other moral issues, are not, I
take it, the product of theoretical reflection. There are religious converts, but I do not believe that he is one, and I doubt that theoretical
reflection plays a big role in many conversions.8 7 Finally, I did not intend to draw a sharp line between altruism and love. There is selfish
altruism ("reciprocal altruism," for example) and selfish love; there is
also selfless altruism, which is a form of selfless love, as Noonan suggests. My doubts concern the possibility of using this insight to power
moral reasoning.
V. MARTHA NUSSBAUM

Professor Nussbaum is known for treating Greek tragedies, the
novels of Henry James, and other works of imaginative literature as
works of moral philosophy, and one of her motives for doing so is her
opposition, like that of Kronman, to "the academicization and professionalization of philosophy."8 But, faced with a challenge by an outsider, she closes ranks with the academicized and professionalized
moral philosophers and endeavors to catalogue their successes in the
85 See id.
86 Id. at 1774.
87 Cf.LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY

92, at 14e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell 1969).
88 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERA-

see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHIcS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY x5-I6 (1986); Martha C. Nussbaum, Rage and
Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. x I & 18, 1997, at 36.
TURE 20 (9o);
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world of action. To make the catalogue at all impressive, she is forced,
again much like Kronman, to range far afield - to Rousseau, Cicero,
Marx (again!), and Burke, none of whom was an academic; to Amartya Sen, who is primarily an economist rather than a philosopher; and
to John Dewey in his capacity as a philosopher of education, which is
not the same thing as a moral philosopher.8 9 Nussbaum suggests that
if Cicero and the others were living today, they would be tenured academics, just like herself. 90 But in saying this she reveals that she has
missed the point of my distinction between moral entrepreneurs and
academic moralists. These are different vocations. The conditions of
the modem academy (tenure, specialization, professionalization, physical safety, material comfort, careerism, political irrelevance) make it
virtually impossible for its denizens to acquire the vision and prestige
of the long-dead philosophers for whom she claims influence - more
influence, I might add, than they deserve. I find the idea that the
world is more peaceful because of Kant an amazing one.
She gives only two examples of the influence of academic moralism
on thought or action in the United States: Peter Singer's advocacy of
animal rights and the philosophical literature on bioethics. These are
examples of influence, all right, but they are not good examples of the
influence of academic moralism. Singer does not write like an academic philosopher (more power to him!) or, more to the point, offer
much in the way of philosophical argument. 91 And the best bioethics
92
is the least philosophical.
Nussbaum says that "there are many different routes to influence"
and adds that "[s]ometimes ethical theorists are also influential politicians. '93 But the most recent of her examples, Marcus Aurelius, died
i8oo years ago. 94 She notes that some other ethical theorists have been
"practical entrepreneurs,"9 5 but her examples are Dewey (as the foun89 We shall see shortly that there may be a buried reference to Kant in Nussbaum's discussion
of a recent book by Kristen Monroe. See infra pp. 1817-19.
90 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise,iiI HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1781 n.20 (1998).
91 His book Animal Liberation, first published in 1975 (a revised edition was published in
1995), which played a significant role in the growth of the animal rights movement, see, e.g.,
GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 51-53 (1996), is written for a general audience. It contains little technical phi-

losophy, makes little effort to respond to philosophical criticisms, and relies heavily on vivid descriptions of animal suffering for its effectiveness. James Jasper calls Singer's book "a gold mine
of gruesome photos," but points out that the idea of animal rights, which has been extremely influential (remember the name of the movement), owes nothing to Singer's book (Singer is a utilitarian) and is philosophically dubious. JAMES M. JASPER, THE ART OF MORAL PROTEST: CULTURE, BIOGRAPHY, AND CREATIVITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 167-68 (1997).
92 See, e.g., JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRACTICAL REASONING IN BIOETHICS (1997). Childress
complains that other philosophers regard his work in bioethics as insufficiently theoretical. See
id. at 32. That is its strength.
93 Nussbaum, supra note 90, at 1792.
94 It's odd to call a Roman emperor an "influential politician."
95 Nussbaum, supra note 9o, at 1792.
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der of progressive education, which is not a moral system) and Sen (for
his success as an economist in getting the United Nations Development
Programme to adopt his measure of welfare).9 6 Most ethical theorists,
certainly today, are neither politicians nor entrepreneurs, but writers
and teachers. Nussbaum acknowledges the narrowness of the life experience of academic moralists, implies that they should try not to
spend their whole lives in the university, concedes that "[t]oo often, our
insularity is evident in the way we write," 97 and acknowledges that
philosophers encounter difficulties in trying to address a broader audience than their fellow academics, that "the journals in which one must
publish to get tenure discourage a more flexible use of style," and that
"the jargon-laden nonwriting of the philosophical journals is a good
style for persuading no human being."9 8 Right on.
While acknowledging all this, she denies that "good philosophy" is
"valueless. "99 I never said it was, my criticisms being limited to academic moralism, that is, modern-day normative moral philosophy. She
says that good philosophers who influence people's beliefs are ones
who "employ the resources of the imagination [to draw] people into
philosophical argument in the way that Plato does, or Cicero, or
Hume, or Rousseau, or William James." 10 0 All her models are long
dead. That is not adventitious. In her references to jargon and insularity and tenure imperatives and never leaving school, Nussbaum,
like Kronman, has identified features of modern moral philosophy that
show it to be a profession in the Weberian ("disenchanted") sense.
This sense is incompatible with moral entrepreneurship and hence
with a reasonable expectation that one can alter people's moral beliefs
or practices. Normative moral philosophy today is indeed academicized and professionalized.
As evidence that it can nevertheless affect people's behavior, Nussbaum cites a study of rescuers of Jews during World War II, and other

96 The all-time greatest entrepreneur, in her sense, among moral philosophers should be Bentham. I acknowledge that since Sen is also a philosopher, it is possible that his success as a practical entrepreneur owes something, and maybe a lot, to his philosophical training. I further acknowledge the possibility that Nussbaum herself, a prominent "public intellectual," may fit the
"practical entrepreneur" bill. She does not claim that, possibly out of modesty, and I will not attempt to evaluate such a claim.
97 Nussbaum, supra note go, at 1794.
98 Id. at 1795.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1794. She turns Nietzsche into a contented academic who resigned his professorship
solely because of bad health. It is true that his resignation (in May of 1879) was precipitated by
poor health, but he had already decided that "in the long run an academic existence is impossible
for me." Letter to Franz Overbeck (Aug. 1877), quoted in R.J. HOLLINGDALE, NiETZSCHE 133
(ig6s); see also RONALD HAYMAN, NIETZSCHE I90 (I98O). As early as 1874, he was thinking of
giving up his professorship. See id. at i7I.
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altruists, by Kristen Monroe. 10 1 Nussbaum makes strong claims for
Monroe's study:
[The study] shows that the most salient feature [that rescuers and other altruists] share is a particular outlook on the relatedness of human beings,
an outlook that holds that all human beings are interconnected, interdependent, and equal in worth. This outlook could, of course, be imparted
in many ways, and philosophy is only one way through which it came to
the rescuers. But it is a universal moral-theoretical view.' 02
Nussbaum's summary is misleading and indeed reverses Monroe's

meaning. Monroe does find that altruists tend to have "a particular
way of seeing the world, and especially themselves in relation to oth-

ers."10 3 She says that "[a]ll the altruists I interviewed saw themselves
04
as individuals strongly linked to others through a shared humanity.'
But as for people being "equal in worth," that is Nussbaum's addition;

the rescuers in Monroe's study tended to value life in all its forms,
nonhuman as well as human, rather than being egalitarian or socialis-

tic.'0 5 And there is no hint that any of the rescuers or other altruists
became such through philosophy. 0 6 The index to Monroe's book con-

tains no entries for philosophy or education. On the contrary, this
book that Nussbaum has nominated to illustrate the moral-theoretical
springs of altruism emphasizes the spontaneous, unreflective, nontheo-

rized character of altruistic behavior, whether episodic or, as in the
case of many World War II rescuers, stretched out long enough to give
the rescuers time to engage in moral reflection if they had wanted to;

they didn't want to. Monroe denies that altruistic behavior emanates
from "the conscious adoption of and adherence to certain moral values." 1 7 Indeed, she finds: "[I]t was the rescuers, the individuals who
came closest to pure altruism on my conceptual continuum, who deviated most from the universal moral principles of ethics and morality.
THE HEART OF ALTRUISM (I996).
Nussbaum, supra note go, at 1783 n.33 (citation omitted).
103 MONROE, supra note ioi, at 213.
101 KRISTEN RENwICK MONROE,
102

It should be noted, however, that her interview sample was very small. It consisted of
104 Id.
only 2o altruists, of whom five were philanthropists, five were "heroes" (ordinary people who
risked their lives to save people in danger), and ten were rescuers of Jews. See id. at 16-x8.
105 See id. at 2o6-07. But don't think that love of animals is a dependable route to love of
man. Luc Ferry, in his book The New Ecological Order, remarks on the pioneering role of Nazi
Germany in the protection of animals, and notes that the founding statement was by Hitler himself, who declared that "in the new Reich cruelty toward animals should no longer exist." Luc
FERRY, THE NEw ECOLOGICAL ORDER 9I (Carol Volk trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1995)
(1992). Ferry remarks "the disturbing nature of this alliance between an utterly sincere zoophilia
(it was not limited to words but was borne out in law) and the most ruthless hatred of men history
has ever known." Id. at 93.
106 Although one of them, an ethnic German who lived in Prague during the Nazi era, "described himself as some combination of agnostic, Kantian, and pantheist," he was emphatic that
he "never made a moral decision to rescue Jews." MONROE, supra note io, at xi (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Id. at 231.
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Furthermore, this deviance was necessary in order to act altruistically." 1 Here she anticipates Michael Gross's study, published the
following year, which I cited in my Lectures. 0 9
I note some other inaccuracies in Nussbaum's Response:
Elizabeth Anderson will be surprised to read that her "philosophiof economics," from which I quoted in the Lectures, is not
cal critique[]
"serious." 1 0 My quotations are from a book by Anderson that, as its
title, Value in Ethics and Economics, indicates, is centrally, rather than
peripherally or casually, concerned with economics."'
Rawls does not deem persons in the Original Position risk-averse
only with respect to political and other noneconomic questions, as
Nussbaum suggests." 2 The difference principle, which uses the concept of maximin - maximizing the welfare of the worst-off - to limit
unequal distribution of wealth, is profoundly risk-averse.' 3 Also,
Rawls does believe that a rational person has consistent time prefer4
ence over his lifetime."
Nussbaum misunderstands my point about the undesirability of
moral uniformity She thinks that I am preaching tolerance of divergent views of the good life, just like Mill and Rawls. My point, supported by Monroe's book, is rather that society needs people who do
not obey the moral code" 5 as well as "good" people, whether or not the
"bad" are acting in accordance with a dissenting morality.
Like Dworkin, Nussbaum ascribes to me radical positions that I
made clear I do not hold. She says I keep insisting "that people have
no right to criticize societies that do things differently."" 6 I expressly
repudiated that view, calling it "vulgar relativism."" 7 I am also not a
108 Id. at z85.
109 See Posner, supra note 9, at 1683 & n.89 (citing MICHAEL L. GROSS, ETHICS AND ACTivISM: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL MORALITY (1997)).
110 Nussbaum, supra note go, at 1777 n.g. And Onora O'Neill may wonder what restoration of

context Fried proposes, see Fried, supra note 42, at 1747, to salvage her economic analysis of philanthropy, which, with all respect, I continue to think economic nonsense.
111 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993). It has separate
chapters titled "The Ethical Limitations of the Market," "Is Women's Labor a Commodity?" and
"Cost-Benefit Analysis, Safety, and Environmental Quality"
112 See Nussbaum, supra note go, at 1778 n.ii.
113 Rawls does not justify his maximin principle in terms of risk aversion in the technical economic sense, so both Nussbaum and I are imprecise in speaking of risk aversion in this connection. But he comes close in discussing the "strains of commitment." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 176-78 (1971); see also id. at 153-54.
114 See id. at 293-95. I should have thought it clear from the context of my statement that I

was referring to time preference, that is, to whether people discount the future at different rates
over their lifetimes. Obviously people's preferences for specific goods and services (toys, baby
sitters, artificial hips, philosophical treatises, and so forth) change during their lives.
115 A need that has nothing to do, as Dworkin supposes me to believe, with "mutations." See
Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1736.
116 Nussbaum, supra note go, at 1786.
117 Posner, supra note 9, at 1642.
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Pyrrhonian, who aims at "ridding people of belief."",, I do not advocate peace of mind as the supreme good for man or deny the principle
of noncontradiction. I do not argue that "rational argument never persuades people." 1 9 I argue that academic moralism is useless, and I regard Nussbaum's parsing of the differences between neo-Humeans,
neo-Aristotelians, and neo-Kantians as just so much sand in the eyes.
Rather than relying on the "common presumption that [moral] theories
have an influence," 120 a presumption common only to moral theorists,
she should have given the reader some examples of how moral theory
(not education theory, not economic theory, and not animal rights polemics) is influencing law and public policy in America today.
Nussbaum accepts my characterization of abortion as "chopping
up" rather than "pulling the plug." But she adds that if the woman
desiring the abortion was raped or a victim of incest, "one [could] argue that even 'chopping up' is a permissible response to a pregnancy
resulting from such violent aggression." 12' One can argue anything,
but this would be a particularly bad argument, since the aggressor is
the rapist, not the fetus. Imagine that A shoves B, an innocent bystander, into C, injuring C. Would C be privileged to retaliate against
B? Is that really arguable? If that's where moral philosophy leads, we
can do without moral philosophy.
Nussbaum claims that I gave too short shrift to Judith Jarvis
Thomson's well-known argument for a right to abortion. I thought I
had said enough to show that it was a thoroughly bad argument. But
since Nussbaum wants amplification, let me give it. The analogy on
which Thomson's argument turns 22 fails for the following reasons.
First, we can have no reliable intuitions concerning a hypothetical case
that is so far outside our experience. Second, a woman normally is not
118 Nussbaum, supra note go, at 1788 n.57. I am likewise not, as Dworkin thinks I may be, a
postmodernist science skeptic, see Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1719 n.6, another careless charge, in
view of the emphasis in the Lectures on my commitment to scientific theory. Noonan is closer to
the mark in describing me as one who "worship[s]" "the scientific method or Science," though
that's a bit extreme in the other direction. Noonan, supra note 8o, at 1768.
119 Nussbaum, supra note go, at 1793. She's correct, however, that not all academic moralists
fall into either the secular-liberal or religious-conservative camp, though most do, and Nussbaum's own writings contain no trace of religiosity, even though she classifies herself in her Response as religious-liberal. I should have qualified my discussion accordingly. It is typical of the
style of academic disputation illustrated by Nussbaum's Response that she should cite this trivial
failure of qualification as one of numerous "examples" of the "sheer casualness and inaccuracy of
Posner's treatment [of academic philosophy]." Id. at 1782. No other examples are given. Her
comparison of my Lectures to an undergraduate paper, see id. at 1779, is in the same vein of
schoolmasterish censure.
120
121

Id. at 1791.
Id. at 1779.

122 Recall that Thomson analogizes a woman forced to carry her fetus to term to a person
forced to spend nine months in bed connected by tubes to a stranger (a famous violinist) in order
to prevent his dying from kidney disease. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, i
PHIL. & PUB.AFF. 47, 48-49 (197i).
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immobilized by being pregnant. Third, the fetus is not a stranger to its
mother. The law punishes a mother's neglect of her child even if the
child was the product of a rape; Thomson does not suggest that she
disapproves of such punishment or thinks it anomalous that the parents do not have equivalent legal duties to other people's children.
Fourth, it is not obvious that the law should not impose a. general duty
to rescue strangers when the rescue can be effected without mortal
peril to the rescuer. The laws of many European countries impose
such duties,1 23 and the objections to imposing them are of a practical
character unrelated to any moral right not to be a good Samaritan.
Fifth, as Nussbaum recognizes, the abortion doctor doesn't merely pull
the plug on the fetus.' 2 4 In a first-trimester abortion, he uses surgical
instruments or a suction pump to remove the fetus from the uterus. In
a second-trimester abortion, he uses surgical instruments to remove the
fetus or injects a chemical that either kills the fetus in order to induce
premature labor or just induces premature labor. Whatever the
method and whatever the stage of the pregnancy, the doctor is employing force for the purpose and with the effect of killing the fetus. And
although the killing is a byproduct of the procedure rather than its ultimate goal, the same is true when a child kills his parents in order to
inherit their money. The surgical procedure used in second-trimester
abortion routinely includes the crushing of the fetus's cranium, and
even in first-trimester abortion the fetus is sometimes removed piecemeal, with "the fragments [then] reassembled to see if the fetus is essentially complete," 25 because any fetal tissue remaining in the uterus
could cause infection. 2 6 In the rare third-trimester abortion, the doctor kills the fetus either by injecting a chemical into its heart or by
drilling a hole in its cranium and removing its spinal fluid through the
hole.
The precise medical technique is unimportant, although it is a commentary on the quality of the abortion debate that the supporters of
abortion rights never talk about what abortion actually involves, while
the opponents never talk about the compelling reasons that women
and girls frequently have for deciding to have an abortion. What is
important for the present discussion is that abortion is killing rather
123

See Alberto Cadoppi, Failureto Rescue and the Continental Criminal Law, in THE DUTY

TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 93, OO-O4 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall
Smith eds., 1993); John P. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1073, iio,-o6 (g6i).

124 For a lucid clinical description of abortion techniques, see Alan F. Guttmacher & Irwin H.

Kaiser, The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in New York: A PersonalInsight, in ABORTION,
MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 546, 557-64 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992).
125 Michael S. Burnhill, Reducing the Risks of Pregnancy Termination, in PREVENTION AND
TREATMENT OF CONTRACEPTiVE FAiLuRE 141, 145 (Uta Landy & S.S. Ratnam eds., 1986).
126 See David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, Morbidity and Mortality from Second-Trimester
Abortions, 30 J. REPROD. MED. 505, 512 (1985); Guttmacher & Kaiser, supra note 124, at 559-61.
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than letting die. So, because opponents of abortion consider the fetus
a full-fledged human being - and Thomson grants them their premise
for the sake of argument - they consider the abortion doctor and the
woman who hires him to be murderers. The moral position of these
prolifers is consistent with not deeming the failure to rescue a true
stranger a crime at all, even if such failure could be thought a "taking"
of innocent life; action and inaction often carry a different moral valence even when their consequences are similar.
This effort to amplify my criticisms of Thomson will not satisfy
Nussbaum, for she insists that I provide "a sustained critique of the
arguments of the 'academic moralists' (and ...of the major historical
figures whose views they advance)," as well as "a scrutiny of major
cases in which philosophical views are generally thought to have
changed public or private morality, showing that the received view of
philosophical influence is inaccurate.' 2 7 Though the phraseology is
that of an assignment to a Ph.D. candidate, this is the lawyer's trick
(demonstrating, to be sure, that Nussbaum has benefited from her affiliation with a law school) of trying to defeat an opponent not with
evidence, but by putting on him a crushing burden of proof; it would
take a lifetime and more to prove the case against academic moralism
to Nussbaum's satisfaction. The first half of her challenge (providing
the "sustained critique'), moreover, asks me to play on her turf, engaging with the normative moral philosophers on their terms, whereas
my principal argument is that those are the wrong terms for judges
and others seeking guidance on how to act. In this respect her tactic
resembles Dworkin's rhetorical stratagem of insisting that the only
permissible, indeed the only possible, criticism of moral theory is itself
a moral argument.
I end this Reply by referring to a recent work of moral philosophy
by Michele Moody-Adams,12 8 who has a deeper awareness of the
problematic nature of normative moral philosophy than does Dworkin,
Fried, or Nussbaum. Moody-Adams is a card-carrying academic moralist. 2 9 Yet she rejects the idea that moral philosophy can be thought
the problem-solving equal of science,1 30 criticizes moral philosophers
for "attempt[ing] to turn moral problems into philosophical puzzles,"
and warns that "[t]he results may make good or even great philosophy,
but they will prove unsatisfactory as a form of moral inquiry.' 3 ' She
finds "no reason to think that the process of moral inquiry might eventually result in 'convergence' on some one theory,' 32 says that
127 Nussbaum, supra note go, at 1777.
128 MICHELE M. MooDY-ADAms, FIELDWORK
AND PHILOSOPHY (1997).
129 See id. at I.

IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE,

130 See id. at 132-33.
131 Id. at 136.
132 Id. at 143.
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"[p]hilosophy is not authoritative in moral argument[,] nor is it even
primus inter pares,"'1 3 regards the sort of disagreement that Rawls and
Nozick have over the nature of justice as simply unresolvable, 3 4 rejects "[t]he notion that the proper task of moral philosophy is to validate systematic moral conceptions,' 35 and, in short, acknowledges
136
that "[m]oral theories do not, indeed cannot, solve moral problems."'
Although she applauds moral philosophy's "tendency to encourage
self-scrutiny"' 3 7 by inculcating "standards of reasonableness in argument" and related analytic skills, she undercuts this encomium by
saying that "evidence of moral expertise is displayed in reliably living a
moral life, and there is absolutely no evidence that moral philosophers
do this better than - or even as well as - non-philosophers." 13 The
only examples she gives in support of her not yet extinguished faith in
moral inquiry by philosophers are of nonacademic moral entrepreneurship, such as civil rights demonstrations in the early I96os.
It's as if she thinks that moral inquiry as it should be conducted by
philosophers has not yet begun, that the discipline is still in the
ground-clearing stage, the stage in which fallacies are uprooted and
wrong turns signposted. I think she's right. But twenty-five hundred
years is a long time to be standing at the starting gate, waiting for the
race to begin.
133 Id. at 176.
134 See id. at 133, 41-42. It leads to the standoff that Hilary Putnam calls "respectful contempt." HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 165-66 (1981); cf. LLOYD L. WEiNREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 239-40 (1987) (arguing that Raws's and Nozick's theories
both fail as general theories of justice, because there is no agreed theoretical basis for defining
their limits).
135 MOODY-ADAMS, sUIra note 128, at 184.
136 Id. at 173.
137 Id. at 170.
138 Id. at 175.
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